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Abstract
The productive efficiency of a firm can be decomposed into two parts,
one persistent and one transient. This distinction seems to be appealing
for regulators. During the last decades, public utilities such as water and
electricity have witnessed a wave of regulatory reforms aimed at improving
efficiency through incentive regulation. Most of these regulation schemes use
benchmarking , namely measuring companies’ efficiency and rewarding them
accordingly. Focusing on electricity distribution, we sketch a theoretical
model to show that an imperfectly informed regulator may not disentangle
the two parts of the cost efficiency. Therefore, the regulator may fail to set
optimal efficiency targets, which also undermines quality. We then provide
evidence on the presence of persistent and transient efficiency using data on
28 New Zealand electricity distribution companies between 2000 and 2011.
First, we estimate a total cost function by means of traditional stochastic
frontier models for panel data. These come up with an estimation of the
persistent part or the transient part of the cost efficiency. Finally, we use
the more recent generalized true random effects model that allows for the
simultaneous estimation of both transient and persistent efficiency. We also
find some evidence that persistent efficiency is associated to higher quality,
and wrong efficiency targets are associated to lower quality compliance.
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1 Introduction
During the last twenty years, several countries have introduced reforms in public
utility sectors, such as water, electricity and telecommunications. Regarding
electricity, two key elements of these reforms are the introduction of competition
in the supply and generation of electricity, and the introduction of new regulation
methods in the transmission and distribution of electricity considered as natural
monopolies. The new methods apply the incentive regulation theory (Laffont and
Tirole, 1993). They provide incentives for productive efficiency by compensating
the company with its savings.1 Several incentive-based schemes make use of
information on the level of overall productive efficiency (or cost efficiency) of an
electricity distribution company, i.e. technical and allocative efficiency.
The level of productive efficiency can be decomposed into two parts, one
persistent and one transient (Colombi et. al., 2014). The presence of structural
problems in the organization of the production process or systematic shortfalls in
managerial capabilities can generate the persistent part. Conversely, the presence
of non-systematic management problems in the short term, the hiring of new
workers that require some initial learning time for their tasks, or the adjustment
in the production process due to new regulation or new techniques may determine
the transient part. Failing to distinguish between these two types of efficiency in
the regulation process may lead to serious consequences. Since the application of
price cap regulation is based on erroneous estimation of persistent and transient
efficiency gains, service quality provided by electricity distribution companies
could suffer. Also, investment decisions could be postponed and incentives for
innovation adoption could be weakened.
In this paper we show that imperfect information exposes the regulator to
wrong efficiency target setting, which may worsen the already existing problem
of quality provision. We argue that one reason for this might be the underesti-
mation of the persistent component of inefficiency. To overcome this problem,
there are recent econometric methods to estimate stochastic frontier models that
1See Joskow and Schmalensee (1986) for a review of incentive regulation models. Incentive
regulation in electricity distribution has been investigated by several authors. See, for instance,
Cullmann and Nieswand (2016) for Germany, Bla´zquez-Go´mez and Grifell-Tatje´ (2011) for
Spain, and Weyman-Jones (1990) and Jamasb and Pollitt (2007) for the UK.
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could be applied to enable a distinction between the two inefficiency components.
These methods could represent a useful tool for regulation authorities.
We build our argument around a theoretical part, a methodological part and
some suggestive evidence that follows from the empirical analysis. In the first
part of the paper, we sketch a theoretical model that shows the importance of
the distinction between persistent and transient inefficiency in the application
of a price-cap regulation method. The problem of information acquisition on
firms efficiency under price cap regulation is a critical one and has been widely
investigated in the literature (e.g. Bernstein and Sappington, 1999; Iossa and
Stroffolini, 2002). However, the regulatory implications of the lack of information
on different types of efficiency have not been debated yet. The theoretical model
illustrates how imperfect information on persistent and transient inefficiency may
undermine the effectiveness of price-cap regulation and worsen service quality.
In the second part of the paper, we apply the most recent econometric method
(GTRE model) proposed by Colombi et al. (2014) and Filippini and Greene
(2016) to provide evidence on the presence of persistent and transient inefficiency
in the electricity distribution sector using a sample of 28 New Zealand electricity
distribution companies. This approach shows that a methodological improve-
ment that disentangle the two efficiency components may provide a response to
the regulatory problem, as discussed in the theoretical framework. Indeed, we
find significant differences in the efficiency estimates as well as in the efficiency
rankings obtained with the most recent econometric method as compared to tra-
ditional stochastic frontier methods. However, none of the regulation authorities
around the world has made a distinction so far between persistent and transient
inefficiency in the electricity distribution sector. Therefore, the new method
could be used by regulatory authorities to refine the price cap mechanism.
The literature on the estimation of cost efficiency of regulated industries
through classical econometric approaches is abundant.2 Among the most fre-
quent applications of frontier modelling we find several articles on energy services
(e.g. Chen, Pestana and Borges, 2015; Ghosh and Kathuria, 2016), transporta-
tion services (e.g. Filippini et al., 2015; Walter, 2011), and water services (e.g.
2See Ramos-Real (2005) for a review of part of these studies.
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Phillips, 2013). Finally, very few studies focus on electricity distribution in New
Zealand (Filippini and Wetzel, 2014; Nillesen and Pollit, 2011; Scully, 1999).
These studies either rely on classical models (Pitt and lee, 1981) or true random
effects (TRE) models (Greene, 2005a, 2005b). As a consequence, they provide
information either on the persistent part or on the transient part of the ineffi-
ciency.
In the third part of the paper we provide some suggestive evidence that
persistent efficiency and service quality are related but the regulatory system
does not use this information in setting efficiency targets. In particular, we show
that the level of persistent efficiency estimated by our econometric approach is
correlated to service quality, i.e firms that are relatively more efficient tend to
show higher service quality. Moreover, the number of New Zealand electricity
distribution companies that do not comply with the regulated level of quality is
remarkable (around 37%). Clearly, this is only a suggestive evidence since we
rely on limited information to assess whether the lack of association between
quality compliance and persistent efficiency is due to reasons other than the
wrong setting of efficiency targets. Ideally, the best support to the results of
our theoretical model should be provided by comparing a regulated setting with
no distinction between transient and persistent efficiency with a setting that
takes into account this distinction, which is not possible. However, we can show
that differences arising from different estimation methods in terms of efficiency
ranking are statistically significant.
We organize this paper as follows. Section 2 sketches the theoretical model
that investigates how regulation may fail when persistent and transient ineffi-
ciency are ignored. Section 3 introduces the cost model specification and the
estimation approaches, while Section 4 describes the data. In Section 5, we
present the estimation results and discuss some suggestive evidence. Section 6
summarizes and concludes.
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2 A model of persistent and transient inefficiency in
a regulated industry
To understand the implications of transient and persistent inefficiency of elec-
tricity distribution companies in New Zealand, we sketch a model where firms
maximize the current value of future profits under price cap regulation. In the
market there are N identical firms acting as local monopolies.3 Each firm chooses
price (pt) and service quality (qt) in each regulatory period t (t ≥ 1) as well as
the level of managerial effort (et). Managerial effort allows obtaining transitory
efficiency gains, which are immediately exploitable in terms of cost reductions,
and lagged (or persistent) efficiency gains that cut costs now as well as in the
future. We show that the regulator cannot achieve optimal efficiency targets
if imperfectly informed on persistent efficiency. Regulation failure may lead to
postponed expenditures, which worsens service quality, or increases in monopoly
rents. In addition, higher pressure to meet current minimum quality standards
may undermine a firm’s compliance and also result in delayed expenditures and
poorer quality in the future.4
Consider first the following demand for electricity distribution services faced
by each firm:
s(pt, qt) = qt (θ − pt) , (1)
where qt∈ [0,+∞) is service quality, pt is unit price, and θ is a parameter indi-
cating the reservation price for a unit of quality.5
The following equation describes total costs at the end of the regulatory
period t:
c(pt, qt, et, et−1, .., e1) = γs(pt, qt)+
(
η −
∑t
j=1
αet−j
)
+β (1− et)+f(qt)+g(et),
3In practice, firms are single-product monopolists. For a model of price cap regulation with
multi-market monopolists when the costs of serving different markets vary, see for instance
Cowan (1997a).
4Recently, Di Giorgio et al. (2015) proposed a theoretical approach to separate structural (or
institutional) inefficiency from managerial inefficiency in public and private nursing homes. The
model applies to a different regulatory setting - global budget instead of price cap regulation -
and does not elaborate on the implications for the regulatory mechanism.
5Following the seminal paper by Mussa and Rosen (1978), we also considered the alternative
functional form s(pt, qt) = qtθ−pt, where quality affects willingness to pay but not the slope of
the demand. The main results are unchanged. Calculation details are available upon request.
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(2)
where γ is the unit cost of electricity distribution services, η is a long-lasting
(or persistent) cost component and β is a temporary (or transient) cost com-
ponent. Transient costs (β) can be reduced immediately by current effort et,
with et∈ [0, 1]. Conversely, persistent costs (η) can only be reduced in the future
by delayed and long-lasting efficiency effort. Delayed long-lasting savings from
effort are
∑t
j=1 αet−j , where α is the marginal impact of effort on persistent
costs, with η ≥ αt. In t = 1 there are no lagged effects of effort since no effort is
assumed in period 0 before the regulation starts, i.e. e0 = 0.
Cost persistency may arise for several reasons. For instance, management
habits lead to inertia, which prevents improving tasks or solving problems im-
mediately. In addition, environmental and social constraints related to share-
holders’ preferences, access to inputs, or the fulfillment of legal rules may affect
the timing of efficiency gains. Finally, unions’ bargaining power may succeed in
postponing the achievement of efficiency targets.
Both quality and managerial effort are costly to the firm. We assume in-
creasing marginal cost functions where f(qt) = q
2
t /2 is the cost of quality and
g(et) = e
2
t /2 is the cost of managerial effort.
6,7
2.1 Price cap regulation
We assume that the firm maximizes the current value of future economic profits
in each period subject to a price cap constraint. Firm’s intertemporal profits at
time t can be written as
Vt =
∞∑
t=k
δt−kpit (pt, qt, et, et−1, .., e1) , (3)
where
pit (pt, qt, et, et−1, .., e1) = pts(pt, qt)− c (pt, qt, et, et−1, .., e1) , (4)
and δ ≤ 1 is the discount factor for future profits.
6For instance, one can think to the cost of remunerating the performance of the manager
through an increase in the wage.
7Other functional forms for the cost of quality and managerial effort could be used without
affecting the final results, provided that the realistic assumption of increasing marginal costs is
preserved.
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The energy authority sets a price cap for the regulatory period t according
to the following rule:
pts(p
∗
t , q
∗
t )
pt−1s(p∗t , q∗t )
≤ CPIt
CPIt−1
−Xt, (5)
where CPIt and CPIt−1 are Consumer Price Indexes and pt−1 is the reference
price from the previous regulatory period, with initial price p0 = P0.
8 Xt is the
expected efficiency gain (persistent and transient) based on past performance or
average performance of other firms in the market.9 Let us assume that prices do
not inflate, i.e. CPIt = CPIt−1.10 Therefore, the price cap rule in Eq. (5) can
be written as:
pt ≤ pt−1 (1−Xt) . (6)
In addition, a minimum quality standard (MQS) is set by the regulator to
limit the risk of poor quality service:
qt ≥ qmin = qt−1. (7)
This standard can be implemented by periodical controls on service quality. The
combination of price cap and MQS mechanism applies to the case of electric-
ity distribution companies in New Zealand (Shen and Yang, 2012; New Zealand
Commerce Commission, 2015). Firms are subject to regulation under the Com-
merce Act 1986, which defines a price and quality threshold regime since 2001.
This regulatory mechanism identifies companies whose performance may warrant
further examination. Quality thresholds are based on two criteria: reliability and
engagement with consumers to determine their demand for service quality. The
reliability criterion requires that unplanned interruptions should not exceed the
previous five-year average. The interruption indicators used are SAIDI (Sys-
tem Average Interruption Duration Index - minutes per connected customer)
and SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index - interruptions per
8We consider a standard rule, though alternative price-cap schemes are possible. See Cowan
(1997b) for a comparison of different price-cap schemes in terms of allocative efficiency.
9See Bernstein and Sappington (1999) for a review of the relevant basic principles to deter-
mine the X factor.
10Dropping the inflation component CPIt/CPIt−1 does not affect the insights of our analysis
but simplifies the subsequent equations.
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connected customer). Since 2010, a more rigorous system is in place based on
Default Price-quality Path (DPP) and Customized Price-quality path (CPP). In
the current analysis we simply assume that quality standards are set according
to interruptions in the previous period.
When choosing price, quality and efficiency effort each firm takes into account
the effects not only on its current period profits but also on its demand and costs
in the following periods. This dependence needs to be taken into account when
solving the model for the equilibrium levels of price, quality and effort. Profits
in period t depend upon efficiency effort in periods t− j. In addition, the value
function represented by the flow of all future profits depends on all future levels
of price, quality and efficiency effort. In equilibrium the firm selects price, quality
and efficiency effort that maximize its intertemporal profit given its subsequent
choices of price, quality and efficiency effort. To simplify the analysis we now set
unit costs at zero, therefore γ = 0.11 Because efficiency effort affects profits in the
subsequent period and expected profits are the sum of concave functions in price,
quality and efficiency effort, we can write the following first-order conditions for
the firm using Eqs. (1)-(2), (3)-(4) and the price cap constraint defined by Eq.
(6):12
∂Vt
∂pt
=
∂pit(pt,qt,et,e∗t−1,..,e∗1)
∂pt
= qtθ − 2qtpt − λ1 + δλ1 (1−Xt+1) = 0
∂Vt
∂et
=
∂pit(pt,qt,et,e∗t−1,..,e∗1)
∂et
+
∞∑
j=1
δj
∂pit+j(p∗t+j ,q∗t+j ,e∗t+j ,..,et,e∗t−1,..,e∗1)
∂et
=
= −et + β + α δ1−δ = 0
∂Vt
∂qt
=
∂pit(pt,qt,et,e∗t−1,..,e∗1)
∂qt
= pt (θ − pt)− qt + λ2 − δλ2 = 0
∂Vt
∂λ1
= pt−1 (1−Xt)− pt ≥ 0
∂Vt
∂λ2
= qt − qt−1 ≥ 0,
(8)
where λ1 and λ2 are slack variables. When the quality constraint is not binding,
11From Eq. (9) we see that the marginal cost of electricity distribution affects price and
quality in equilibrium. However, the equilibrium level of efficiency effort is not affected. Since
we focus on the effects of persistent and transient components of efficiency, we avoid further
mathematical complications by assuming that marginal costs of electricity distribution are
negligible. Clearly, marginal costs of quality and efficiency effort are still present in the following
analysis.
12Note that we rule out any firm’s strategic behaviour that raises prices to anticipate future
constraints and influence efficiency targets. The model assumes that firms do not have infor-
mation on the timing of introduction of the new price cap regulation or the discount factor on
future profits is relatively large.
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the solution to the constrained maximization is:
p∗t = p∗t−1 (1−Xt) = Φt
e∗t = β + α
δ
1−δ
q∗t = p∗t−1 (1−Xt)
[
θ − p∗t−1 (1−Xt)
]
= Φt (θ − Φt) > q∗t−1
λ∗1 =
q∗t θ−2q∗t p∗t
[1−δ(1−Xt+1)] =
Φt(θ−Φt)(θ−2Φt)
[1−δ(1−Xt+1)]
λ∗2 = 0
(9)
where Φt = P0
∏t
j=1 (1−Xj). Conversely, when minimum quality standards are
binding, we have:
p∗t = p∗t−1 (1−Xt) = Φt
e∗t = β + α
δ
1−δ
q∗t = q∗t−1 = Φt−1 (θ − Φt−1)
λ∗1 =
q∗t−1θ−2q∗t−1p∗t
[1−δ(1−Xt+1)] =
Φt−1(θ−Φt−1)(θ−2Φt)
[1−δ(1−Xt+1)]
λ∗2 =
q∗t−p∗t (θ−p∗t )
1−δ =
Φt−1(θ−Φt−1)−Φt(θ−Φt)
1−δ .
(10)
where Φt−1 = P0
∏t−1
j=1 (1−Xj).
Note that the equilibrium level of efficiency effort increases with persistent (α)
and transient (β) marginal efficiency gains and the discount factor (δ) on future
earnings. Contrary to the price cap constraint, the quality constraint may or may
not be binding. From solution (9) we can see that an increase in the efficiency
target may lead to lower quality if ∂q∗t /∂Xt = p∗t−1
[
2p∗t−1 (1−Xt)− θ
]
< 0
because the price cap affects quality through the efficiency target Xt. This
happens if the efficiency target is set at too high levels, or Xt > 1−θ/2p∗t−1, which
is increasingly more likely with subsequent reductions in prices. Therefore, the
situation may deteriorate over time even if quality is initially above the minimum
quality standard. For high efficiency targets the level of quality is expected to
fall towards solution (10) with binding minimum quality standards.
From Eqs. (2) and (9)-(10) we see that a perfectly informed regulator es-
timates transient efficiency gains of ET = βe∗t . Note, however, that transient
efficiency gains in each period are already considered in the first-period efficiency
target (X1) to set the price cap p1 ≤ P0 (1−X1). Therefore, transient efficiency
gains should not reduce the price further in the following periods, and should
not be added to efficiency targets set for the following periods (Xt with t > 1).
Clearly, this does not imply that the level of transient efficiency in the regulatory
period is zero.
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As for persistent efficiency, note that in the first period (t = 1) persistent
efficiency gains are zero (EP1 = 0) since no effort is assumed in period 0 before
the first regulatory period. For t > 1 persistent efficiency gains are EPt =∑t−1
j=1 αe
∗
t−j . Since persistent efficiency gains generated in periods t− 2, .., 1 are
taken into account in previous periods efficiency targets, the only persistent effect
not yet considered in the current period is the one-period lead time effect of effort
made in the previous period: αe∗t−1 = EPt / (t− 1).
Using the above result for the equilibrium price (9) we can write the price
cap constraint (6) as pt ≤ P0
∏t
j=1 (1−Xj) = P0 (1−X1)
∏t
j=2 (1−Xj), where
X1 represents the first-period efficiency target which includes only transient ef-
ficiency gains. The remaining efficiency terms Xj represent new persistent ef-
ficiency gains that can be obtained in each of the following periods. Optimal
efficiency targets per unit of output can then be written as:
X∗1 =
ET
s(p∗1, q∗1)
=
β
(
β + α δ1−δ
)
s(p∗1, q∗1)
(11)
X∗t>1 =
EPt / (t− 1)
s(p∗t , q∗t )
=
α
(
β + α δ1−δ
)
s(p∗t , q∗t )
. (12)
We can see that optimal efficiency targets increase with persistent (α) and
transient (β) marginal efficiency gains and the discount factor (δ) on future earn-
ings. In this case, transient and persistent efficiency gains are fully internalized
by the informed regulator.
2.2 Imperfect information on efficiency structure
When the regulator is imperfectly informed about achievable efficiency gains, ef-
ficiency targets cannot be set at the optimal level defined by Eqs. (11)-(12). This
point has been debated in the theoretical literature (see for instance Bernstein
and Sappington, 1999), and recent empirical research developed more sophisti-
cated methods to address imperfect information on firm’s productivity measure-
ment. In fact, some regulators around the world are using empirical methods
to estimate the level of efficiency. However, an additional concern arises about
the regulator’s ability to disentangle different types of efficiency, even when total
efficiency gains are correctly estimated.
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Let us assume that the regulator underestimates persistent inefficiency (or
overestimates transient efficiency). This happens for instance when the regulator
does not expect a delay in the effect of the efficiency effort, hence EP1 (e1) > 0. In
other words, the α component is expected to contribute to cost reductions (also)
in the current period. Consequently, we can modify the cost function above (2)
using
∑t
j=0 αet−j instead of
∑t
j=1 αet−j . Solving the maximization problem with
the modified (dystopian) cost function that ‘anticipates’ some efficiency gains,
we obtain e∗t = β + α
1
1−δ , which is higher than the equilibrium level of effort in
Eq. (9).13 The new efficiency targets will be:
XIF1 =
ET + EP1
s(p∗1, q∗1)
=
(β + α)
(
β + α 11−δ
)
s(p∗1, q∗1)
> X∗1 (13)
XIFt>1 =
EPt /t
s(p∗t , q∗t )
=
α
(
β + α 11−δ
)
s(p∗t , q∗t )
> X∗t>1. (14)
Because the regulator estimates a higher efficiency effort, he will set tighter
efficiency targets. This will reduce firm’s marginal profitability. A possible
consequence is that firms may want to postpone or lessen important expenditures
leading to poor quality service in the current and future periods. From Eq. (9)
we saw that ∂q∗t /∂Xt < 0. Consequently, tighter quality controls are probably
required to avoid too low quality levels.
2.3 Unobserved quality
Poor information regarding quality may exacerbate the possible consequences of
too high efficiency targets leading to disappointing quality compliance. Let us
assume that service quality is affected by random shocks (interruptions) during
the regulatory period. Therefore, the regulator cannot observe the true level of
quality:
q∗t = qˆt + ˜, (15)
13A similar conclusion can be drawn if the regulator does not expect at all long-lasting
savings, and assumes that all cost inefficiency is transitory. We can substitute
∑t
j=1 αet−j with
φet (with φ 1 α) into the cost function and solve again the constrained maximization problem.
Then, we get e∗t = β + φ, which is higher than e
∗
t = β + α
δ
1−δ obtained in Eq. (9) if
φ
α
> δ
1−δ ,
i.e. for relatively low levels of the discount factor (δ) or relatively high expectations of marginal
efficiency (φ).
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where qˆt is the observed level of service quality and ˜ is the exogenous shock
distributed as:
˜ ∈ {,−}, Pr[˜ = ] = ρ, Pr[˜ = −] = 1− ρ. (16)
The probability ρ is unknown to the regulator.
Because of exogenous interruptions, the regulator can only verify if the ob-
served level of quality is in the acceptable range q∗t−1 −  ≤ qˆt ≤ q∗t−1 + .
Since an observed level of quality below q∗t−1 is tolerated if it is not too low, i.e.
qˆt ≥ q∗t−1 −  = qmin, this may provide room for speculation by electricity dis-
tribution companies. Under pressure, companies may be more prone to rely on
positive shocks, thus speculating on the expected level of service quality. Indeed,
the expected level of observable quality is:
qˆt = ρ(q
∗
t + ) + (1− ρ)(q∗t − ) = q∗t + (2ρ− 1). (17)
This may fall below qmin if:
q∗t + (2ρ− 1) < q∗t−1 − . (18)
This inequality depends on the efficiency target set for the current period (Xt).
Since q∗t is decreasing for relatively high levels of the efficiency target, the above
inequality is more likely to be satisfied when the regulator underestimates cost
persistency. Therefore, too high efficiency targets may increase violations of
MQS, ceteris paribus, leading to lower quality compliance.
3 Cost model specification and estimation method
Our theoretical model hypothesizes that there are two components of inefficiency.
If the authority neglects these components, the effectiveness of the regulation
may be undermined. Consequently, the effort to separate transient and persis-
tent inefficiency could improve the performance of the electricity distribution
market. In the following empirical analysis, we show that data availability and
the application of econometric models allow to disentangle transient and per-
sistent inefficiency. Moreover, we provide some evidence that the presence of
persistent efficiency may result in poorer quality levels.
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The total cost of an electricity distribution company can be specified as a
function of input prices and outputs. Moreover, as discussed in Filippini and
Wetzel (2014) and in previous studies on the cost structure of electricity dis-
tribution companies, in the cost model specification it is important to include
a number of output characteristic variables.14 These variables should take into
account the heterogeneity of the electricity distribution companies’ production
environment.
Generally, the explanatory variables considered in the specification of a cost
function for electricity distribution companies are: the quantity of electricity
distributed, the number of customers and the factor prices, some output charac-
teristics such as customer density, network size, service area, service quality and
load factor.
In this analysis, we specify a total cost function with two outputs and three
output characteristics. Unfortunately, the cost model specification does not in-
clude input prices since these data are lacking. Consequently, we hypothesize
that all electricity distribution companies are exposed to the same input prices.15
The total cost can be written as:
TC = c (Y,CU,NL,LF,Q, T ) , (19)
where Y and CU represent the output measured by the electricity supplied in
kilowatt-hours and the number of final consumers, respectively. NL, LF and Q
are output characteristics: NL is the network length, LF denotes the load factor,
and Q is service quality measured by SAIDI, an index of the average interrup-
tion duration of the system. Finally, T is a time trend that captures changes
in the cost over time. In order to be able to compute three type of economies,
i.e. economies of output density, economies of customers’ density and economies
14For a discussion on the estimation of cost functions in the energy sector see Farsi and
Filippini (2009).
15This assumption is used also in previous studies using data from electricity distribution
companies in New Zealand (Nillesen and Pollit, 2011; Filippini and Wetzel, 2014) as well as
by the regulator. It is worth noting that New Zealand is characterized by an open economy
that works on free market principles. This means that the level of interest rates, the price of
inputs, the average salaries are similar across different regions. The market for inputs is quite
competitive and prices are expected to be similar across distribution companies. Finally, in our
GTRE model, part of the possible differences in prices are captured by the individual company
effect.
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of scale, we use the network length instead of customer density previously used
by Filippini and Wetzel (2014). As indicated by the microeconomic theory of
production, the cost function should be concave in input prices, non-decreasing
in input prices and output, and linearly homogeneous in input prices.16
For the estimation of the cost function (19), we use a translog functional
form. The translog has the advantage that it does not impose a priori restric-
tions on the nature of the technology. However, in case the model specification
includes some variables relatively highly correlated, then the estimation of the
translog cost function can suffer from multicollinearity. In our case, some of
the explanatory variables, such as the number of customers, the network length
and the load factor, are highly correlated and cause problems in the econometric
estimation. Therefore, we estimate a reduced version of the translog, where all
interaction variables between the two outputs and output characteristics have
been dropped. Based on Eq. (19) the reduced translog cost function can be
expressed as:
lnTCit = β0 + βY lnYit + βCU lnCUit + βLF lnLFit + βQ lnQit+
+ βNL lnNLit +
1
2
βY Y (lnYit)
2 +
1
2
βCUCU (lnCUit)
2+
+
1
2
βLFLF (lnLFit)
2 +
1
2
βQQ(lnQit)
2 +
1
2
βNLNL(lnNLit)
2+
+ βY CU lnYit lnCUit + βtTt + εit, (20)
where the subscripts i and t denote the firm and year, respectively; and the βs
are unknown parameters to be estimated. The error term in Eq. (20) is still
general and will be specified later from an econometric point of view (see Table
1).
As discussed in more details in Filippini and Greene (2016), several different
panel data stochastic frontier models (SFA) can be used to estimate the level
of productive inefficiency. Some of these models estimate the persistent part
of productive inefficiency, although with different levels of precision. Others
estimate the transient component. Moreover, some recent developed models
provide information on both types of productive inefficiency.
16Due to the fact that in the model specification (19) we are not considering input prices,
some of the properties of the cost function e.g. the concavity in input prices, cannot be verified.
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In this paper, we decided to use three alternative stochastic frontier models:
two classical models and one relatively new model. The first model is the ba-
sic version of the random effects model proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981) (RE
hereafter); the second model is the so-called true random effects model (TRE
hereafter) proposed by Greene (2005a, 2005b); and the third model is the gen-
eralized true random effects model (GTRE) recently introduced by Colombi et
al. (2014) and Filippini and Greene (2016).
The RE model considers the individual random effects as inefficiency rather
than unobserved heterogeneity as in the usual panel data models. This model
provides information on the persistent part of the inefficiency. One problem
with the RE is that any time-invariant, firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity is
considered as inefficiency. As a result, the values obtained by this model are not
precise and tend to underestimate the level of persistent efficiency in electricity
distribution.
The TRE proposed by Greene (2005a and 2005b) extends the SFA model in
its original form (Aigner, et al., 1977) by adding an individual random effect in
the model. In general terms, for the TRE the constant term, β0, in Eq. (20), is
replaced with a series of firm-specific random effects. The improvement provided
by this model is to control for unobserved variables that are constant over time.
However, any time-invariant component of inefficiency is captured by the firm-
specific constant terms. Therefore, the TRE tends to overestimate the level of
efficiency. Generally, the TRE provide information on the time-varying part of
the inefficiency.
The third model (GTRE) offers the possibility to estimate at the same time
the persistent and transient part of inefficiency. Colombi et al. (2014) pro-
posed a theoretical platform to distinguish persistent from transient inefficiency.
Filippini and Greene (2016) suggest a practical completion to the development
by proposing a straightforward, transparent empirical estimation method of the
GTRE. It is worth noting that TRE model provides similar estimates of the
transient part of inefficiency obtained using the GTRE model. This is because,
the transient part of inefficiency in the TRE and GTRE models is specified in
the same way. Table 1 summarizes the three econometric specifications including
the structure of the error term in Eq. (20). In comparison to the RE and the
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TRE models, the error term in the GTRE model is composed of four parts. Two
of them (hi and uit) are half-normal distributed and measure the two inefficiency
components. The other two parts (wi and υit) represent the usual noise and are
two-sided normally distributed.
4 Data
The dataset used in this study is a panel of 28 New Zealand’s electricity distri-
bution businesses (EDBs) between 2000 and 2011.17 The panel is constructed
mainly by exploiting information in the ”NZ EDB Database” from Economic In-
sights (Economic Insights, 2009). This database consists of financial and produc-
tion data on electricity distribution companies. As required by the New Zealand
electricity regulation, financial and production data are yearly published in the
Electricity Information Disclosures.
In terms of the number of connected customers, the size of companies in our
sample varies between 4, 100 and 680, 000. Total cost is defined as the sum of
variable cost and capital cost. Variable cost includes the operating expenses for
labor, materials and services.18 The capital cost is the sum of capital depre-
ciation (or amortization) and the opportunity cost of alternative use of assets.
Regrettably, consistent information on capital cost for the whole period under
observation are not present in the Electricity Information Disclosures. However,
we can use the assets value and some assumptions regarding depreciation and
opportunity cost to approximate the capital cost. For the assets value, we use the
so-called optimized deprival value (ODV), which is the annual monetary value of
the system fixed assets of each distribution company. The ODV captures the loss
of value that a company would bear if deprived of assets.19 Following Lawrence
17Few companies have been excluded because of lack of information. Further, a new company
recently established has been excluded because of too few years of operation. Conversely from
the dataset used by Filippini and Wetzel (2014), our dataset includes only companies that have
already introduced unbundling of their activities. For more details on the data and definition
of variables see Filippini and Wetzel, 2014.
18In New Zealand, the generation, the transmission and the distribution of electricity are
separated. Hence, there is no vertical integration. Ownership unbundling characterizes the
whole period of our data (2000-2011). The Electricity Industry Reform Act (EIRA) in 1998
created three competing publicly-owned companies in the generation sector and the ownership
separation of distribution from retailers (Shen and Yang, 2012).
19The ODV methodology used for asset valuations in the New Zealand’s electricity distribu-
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et al. (2009) and Filippini and Wetzel (2014), we set a common depreciation
rate of 4.5% of ODV and an opportunity cost rate of 8% of ODV. Consequently,
capital cost is nearly 12.5 (4.5 + 8) percent of the annual ODV.20 Total cost is
adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index for New Zealand provided
by the OECD (base 2005).
In addition to outputs, we consider three output characteristic variables:
the load factor, network quality and network length. The load factor captures
the intensity in utilization of the distribution network. This is measured by the
ratio between the electricity supplied and the maximum distribution transformer
demand multiplied by the total number of hours in one year. Lower costs are
expected for distribution companies with higher rates of network utilization.
Therefore, the estimated coefficient of the load factor is expected to show a
negative sign.
The network quality characteristic is measured by SAIDI. This is the average
number of interruption minutes for a consumer within a given period. The impact
of SAIDI on total costs is rather unclear. On the one hand, higher quality, that
is a lower SAIDI, may require more investments and hence may induce higher
capital costs. The higher quality may also lead to lower operational costs. For
the estimation of our models, we decided to use a weighted level of quality instead
of the actual level of quality. The weighted level of quality is the moving average
of the actual level of quality over the previous five years. During the period
under study, the regulator in New Zealand set a minimum level of quality using
the previous five-year average of SAIDI. By using the regulated level of SAIDI,
we can limit the endogeneity problem related to quality and take into account
the relatively high volatility of SAIDI.
Finally, the network length is measured in kilometers to approximate the
service area size. We expect a positive coefficient, indicating that companies
with a larger area size operate at higher costs than companies with smaller
area size do. Some descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study are
tion sector is described in detail by the New Zealand Commerce Commission (2004).
20Clearly, the limitations arising from the use of ODV as a proxy for capital cost are not
ignored. Nevertheless, in the absence of a consistent alternative measure this is plausibly the
best proxy for capital cost.
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provided in Table 2.
5 Results
The estimation results for the three models are given in Table 3.21 These results
show that the coefficients of output, number of customers and network length are
positive and significant across all different estimators. In general, the estimated
coefficients are relatively similar across the estimators, except for the coefficients
of the two outputs and the coefficient of quality. λ is the ratio of the standard
deviation of the inefficiency term uit to the standard deviation of the stochastic
term vit. This ratio is significant and reflects the relatively low contribution to the
decomposed error term εit. The standard deviations of the time fixed symmetric
effects (σw) and the time fixed one-sided effects (σh) are also significant.
Since total costs and regressors are in logarithms and normalized to the me-
dian value, the first order coefficients are interpretable as cost elasticities evalu-
ated at the sample median. All these coefficients have the expected sign and are
highly significant. For instance, the output coefficients suggest that the increase
in costs due to a one percent increase in the number of KWh of electricity dis-
tributed, keeping all other explanatory variables constant, varies between 0.16
and 0.33%. As we see from Table 3 the interaction term between the two outputs
is negative and statistically significant. This suggests the presence of cost com-
plementarities between electricity and number of customers, i.e. companies with
a higher number of customers have a relatively low marginal cost for distributing
electricity.
The coefficient of the network length suggests that the increase in costs due
to a one percent extension in the network, keeping all other explanatory vari-
ables constant, is approximately 0.2%. Further, the coefficient of the number
of customers suggests that the increase in costs due to a one percent increase
in the number of customers, keeping all other explanatory variables constant,
varies between 0.36 and 0.52%.
The coefficient of the time trend is positive and indicates that total costs of
electricity companies increased over time. This result is apparently counterin-
21The estimates are obtained using the software NLogit, version 5.
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tuitive from a theoretical point of view since the time trend should capture the
presence of technical change. However, from an econometric point of view we
should keep in mind that the time trend captures the impact of several factors
that change over time and affect in the same way all companies. For instance,
one possible explanation for the positive sign could be a general increase of input
prices for all companies (not controlled in the model) or a new regulation that
imposes extra costs to the company.
The cost elasticity with respect to the load factor is negative in all specifi-
cations of the cost model, indicating that a 1% improvement in the load factor
reduces costs by approximately 0.1%. Finally, the quality index measured by the
regulated level of interruptions (SAIDI) has a negative and significant impact on
costs, though this impact is quite small. A 1% decrease in quality (i.e. higher
number of interruptions) decreases costs between 0.01 and 0.03%, ceteris paribus.
This suggests that reducing service quality allows firms to save on costs.
5.1 Persistent and transient efficiency
The firm’s inefficiency for the RE and the TRE models are estimated using the
conditional mean of the inefficiency term proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982).
Following Filippini and Greene (2016) and using a result from Colombi (2010)
based on the moment generating function for the closed skew normal distribution,
we compute the inefficiency scores for the GTRE specification.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the cost efficiency estimates for the
28 electricity distribution companies obtained from the econometric estimation
of the three models. The estimation results for the new cost frontier model
(GTRE) provide estimates of the persistent (PGTRE) as well as the transient
component of cost efficiency (TGTRE). The RE model produces values of the
cost efficiency that are time-invariant and, therefore, should reflect the persistent
part of the cost efficiency. On the other hand, the TRE model produces values
that are time varying and, therefore, should reflect the transient part of the cost
efficiency.
The results reported in Table 4 show that the estimated average values of
persistent efficiency vary from 78% in the RE model to 88% in the GTRE model.
Moreover, the estimated average values of the transient efficiency vary from 94%
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in the TRE model to 88% in the GTRE model. Note that the values of the
persistent and transient efficiency obtained with the GTRE model are different
from the values obtained with the TRE and the RE models. This suggestive ev-
idence implies that efficiency scores obtained with the RE and TRE models do
not provide precise information on the level of persistent and transient efficiency.
Finally, Table 5 provides the Pearson’s correlations between the estimated levels
of cost efficiency obtained from the three model specifications. The correlation
between the levels of transient cost efficiency obtained with TRE and GTRE
models is relatively high (0.78). However, the correlation between the values
of the persistent cost efficiency obtained with RE and GTRE models is lower
(0.43). This suggests that the result obtained with the RE model is not mea-
suring the persistent efficiency of the firms correctly. Moreover, the values of
the Spearman’s rank correlation confirm the values obtained with the pairwise
Pearson’s correlation.22 As suggested by Greene (2005b), the reason of such
differences could be that all unobserved time invariant heterogeneity in the RE
model is captured by the individual effect, which is also used to compute the
level of efficiency.
The evidence on the presence of persistent efficiency casts doubts on the
effectiveness of a price cap regulation that does not distinguish the two parts of
efficiency. As suggested by the theoretical model in Section 2, when persistent
and transient efficiency are not estimated correctly the regulator may assume
wrong efficiency targets.
5.2 Efficiency and quality
Theoretically, the regulatory implications of persistent and transient inefficiency
could be assessed by comparing the regulated setting with an ideal setting with-
out price cap and quality regulation. Unfortunately, this experimental design
cannot be performed with our dataset. Still, some figures are worth discussing
and maybe can stimulate opportunities for future research.
The theoretical model suggests that, if the regulator underestimates cost
persistency, service quality may decrease because of the efficiency target is too
22The difference in the efficiency ranking of firms obtained from the three models is also
confirmed by the Kruskal-Wallis rank test.
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ambitious. In New Zealand, one of the objectives of the regulator is to pro-
vide services at a quality that reflects consumer preferences, and the use of total
factor productivity should allow setting efficiency targets according to this ob-
jective (Brown and Moselle, 2008). Within this framework, the regulator does
not disentangle the two parts of efficiency, i.e. the persistent and the transient
components.
Note that, if persistent efficiency is ignored the levels of quality and quality
compliance may suffer. Some preliminary evidence is provided by the estimated
level of persistent efficiency that appears to be positively correlated with quality
(ρ = 0.2). Further, the number of firms that do not comply with the regulated
quality level is remarkable. Around 37% of firms on average across the whole
period are below the regulated quality standard, ranging from a minimum of
15% in 2001 and a maximum of 68% in 2007.
To further investigate this issue, we can build a measure of the information
bias in the estimation of persistent efficiency. We compare the estimates of in-
efficiency from a conventional stochastic frontier pooled model (Aigner et al.,
1977) with the estimates of the GTRE model. In most countries (e.g. Aus-
tria and Germany), national authorities adopt simple frontier models based on
cross-sectional data to estimate the level of efficiency of electricity distribution
companies. This may lead to biased results since persistent efficiency is not cor-
rectly taken into account. Therefore, we can use the results of the GTRE model
as a benchmark of correct information on persistent efficiency and compare them
with the efficiency results of a pooled model that ignores the magnitude of per-
sistent efficiency and considers all the inefficiency as transient. In this way, we
obtain a proxy of the information bias in the estimation of persistent efficiency.
As expected, we observe that the larger the information bias the higher is the
number of firms that do not comply with the regulated quality (ρ = 0.18). Al-
though this correlation is small, the result may cast doubts on the ability of the
regulator to ensure quality compliance when an information bias is present on
the estimation of persistent efficiency.
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5.3 Economies of scale
The estimation results reported in Table 3 can also be used to compute the
value of economies of scale under different econometric models. More precisely,
the inclusion of the number of customers and the network length in the cost
function allows us to derive economies of output density (EOD), economies of
customer density (ECD) and economies of scale (ES). We follow Roberts (1986)
and Filippini (1998) to define these three types of economies.
First, economies of output density are defined as the inverse of the percentage
change in total costs following a percentage change in the output, assuming that
input prices, the load factor, the number of customers and the network length are
unchanged. This corresponds to the inverse of the elasticity of total costs with
respect to output: EOD = 1÷ (∂lnTC∂lnY ). Second, economies of customer density
are expressed as the inverse of the percentage change in total costs generated by a
percentage change in the output and the number of customers, holding constant
input prices, the load factor and the network length. Therefore, economies of cus-
tomer density can written as: ECD = 1÷ (∂lnTC∂lnY + ∂lnTC∂lnCU ). Finally, economies
of scale are defined as the inverse of the percentage change in total costs caused
by a percentage change in the output, the number of customers and the size of
the service area, holding all input prices and the load factor fixed. Economies of
scale (ES) can then be expressed as: ES = 1÷ (∂lnTC∂lnY + ∂lnTC∂lnCU + ∂lnTC∂lnNL).
Based on definitions above, we observe economies of output density if EOD >
1, i.e. if the average cost of an electricity distribution utility decreases as the
volume of electricity sold to a fixed number of customers in a service area of
a given size increases. Similarly, there are economies of customer density if
ECD > 1. This measure is relevant for analyzing the cost of distributing more
electricity to a fixed service area as it becomes more densely populated. Finally,
economies of scale are present when ES > 1.
Table 6 reports the estimates of the three types of economies for a medium
sized firm.23 All indicators are greater than 1, ranging from 1.119 in the GTRE
23All economies have been evaluated at the values for the load factor, SAIDI and consumer
density of the median company. For the interpretation of the results, it is important to note
that a proportional increase in electricity supplied and the number of consumers imply, keeping
the value of the consumer density constant, an increase in the network length.
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model to 1.127 in the TRE model.24 These results tend to support the hy-
pothesis that the electricity distribution sector is characterized by economies of
scale, output and consumer density as obtained in other empirical studies.25 For
instance, a recent study by Tovar et al. (2011) on the Brazilian electricity distri-
bution sector found a median value of economies of scale of approximately 1.48.
It is worth noting that the values reported in Table 6 are slightly larger than the
values provided in a previous study by Filippini and Wetzel (2014) using New
Zealand data. This difference may be due to the relatively simple stochastic
frontier model used in Filippini and Wetzel (2014).
6 Conclusions
The level of productive efficiency of a firm can be split in two parts: a persistent
and a transient component. This distinction can be important in the application
of incentive-based regulation schemes, such as the price cap that uses inefficiency
scores in the definition of prices in water, electricity and telecommunication
sectors. If the regulator ignores or underestimates persistent efficiency, efficiency
targets can be wrongly set. As a consequence, this may lead to quality distortion
and lower quality compliance.
Generally, the empirical literature on efficiency analysis of firms has not paid
a lot of attention to the distinction between these two components. Some scholars
(Colombi et al., 2014; Kumbhakar and Tsionas, 2012; Kumbhakar et al., 2012;
Filippini and Greene, 2016) have recently proposed econometric approaches to
provide separate estimates of the two components of efficiency. Some of these
approaches are relatively cumbersome. In this paper, we apply the estimator
proposed by Filippini and Greene (2016) to assess the level of persistent and
transient efficiency in the New Zealand electricity distribution sector. The esti-
mator is based on maximum simulated likelihood using all the sample distribu-
24Using the Delta method, we computed the 95% confidence intervals for the three types of
economies for the three models. The confidence intervals for the RE model are different from
the confidence intervals obtained using the GTRE and the TRE models. This is not surprising
because in the RE model the output coefficient is not statistically significant. The confidence
intervals in the GTRE and the TRE models are relatively similar.
25For a review of previous studies on economies of scale and density in transmission and
distribution of electricity see Ramos-Real (2005).
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tional information to obtain the estimates, and is very effective and strikingly
simple to apply.
Few studies analyze the level of cost efficiency of New Zealand electricity
distribution companies (Filippini and Wetzel, 2014; Nillesen and Pollitt, 2011;
Scully, 1999) and none of these studies distinguishes the two components of cost
efficiency. Our empirical results show that the transient and the persistent parts
of productive efficiency are relatively different in absolute value and differ from
productive efficiency measured by previous approaches. From a regulatory point
of view, following the theoretical model, the results imply that differentiated
measures of efficiency should be used in regulation. For instance, the regulator
could set (transient) efficiency targets for each year within the regulatory period.
In addition, (persistent) efficiency targets that require more years to be achieved
could be verified only at the end of the regulatory period. Due to the presence
of persistent inefficiency, the regulatory period should be longer than the usual
five-year period defined by the regulation authorities. Therefore, a more flexible
price-cap rule combining short-run efficiency targets (to reduce transient ineffi-
ciency) and long-run efficiency targets (to reduce persistent inefficiency) could
provide some regulatory improvements.
We found some suggestive evidence that higher levels of persistent efficiency
are positively correlated with quality levels. However, electricity distribution
companies seem to suffer systematically from poor quality compliance. Moreover,
quality compliance is decreasing with the information bias of the regulator in the
estimation of persistent efficiency. Further research is needed to confirm these
findings.
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Variable RE TRE GTRE
β0 16.359 16.560 16.449
(499.981) (1474.362) (1380.217)
lnY 0.164 0.241 0.330
(1.602) (11.657) (16.345)
lnCU 0.516 0.425 0.361
(4.210) (18.300) (16.140)
lnLF -0.139 -0.122 -0.144
(-1.190) (-2.785) (-3.478)
lnQ -0.011 -0.015 -0.025
(-0.580) (2.183) (3.816)
lnNL 0.210 0.207 0.213
(2.494) (15.017) (16.526)
lnY∗lnY 0.277 0.202 0.043
(1.147) (2.155) (0.460)
lnCU∗lnCU 0.424 0.326 0.211
(2.023) (3.435) (2.227)
lnLF∗lnLF -0.257 -0.164 -0.150
(-0.499) (-0.619) (-0.719)
lnQ∗lnQ 0.011 0.014 0.033
(0.335) (0.934) (2.421)
lnNL∗lnNL -0.143 -0.157 -0.181
(-1.686) (-15.810) (-18.351)
lnY∗lnCU -0.333 -0.232 -0.088
(-1.441) (-2.548) (-0.976)
T 0.020 0.020 0.021
(11.868) (22.558) (21.754)
σw - 0.192 0.189
- (36.563) (37.417)
λ 4.981 1.734 4.933
(2.030) (6.130) (6.320)
σ2 0.328 0.914 0.119
(4.489) (20.260) (21.530)
σh - - 0.888
- - (13.471)
Log likelihood 336.692 335.893 328.043
Note: σw= standard deviation of time fixed symmetric effects; σh= standard deviation of time fixed
one-sided effects; λ = σuit / σvit ; σ
2=σ2uit+σ
2
vit
; number of observations: n=305.
Table 3: Estimated first and second order coefficients from cost frontier models
(asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses).
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
RE 0.782 0.143 0.515 0.984
TRE 0.940 0.032 0.803 0.987
TGTRE 0.878 0.062 0.644 0.990
PGTRE 0.884 0.021 0.866 0.946
Table 4: Cost efficiency scores.
RE TRE TGTRE PGTRE
RE 1 0.031 -0.235 0.425
TRE 0.315 1 0.779 -0.069
TGTRE -0.235 0.779 1 -0.653
PGTRE 0.425 -0.069 -0.653 1
Table 5: Correlation coefficients.
Economy Economy Economy
of output density of consumer density of scale
RE 6.089 1.470∗∗ 1.123∗∗∗
TRE 4.142∗∗∗ 1.698∗∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗
GTRE 3.031∗∗∗ 1.902∗∗∗ 1.119∗∗∗
Significance levels: ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1.
Table 6: Economies of scale, output and consumer density
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